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Introduction 
 
Security is a dynamic and multi-layered concept. To many, security means 
‘feeling secure’ (subjective security), to others it means ‘measured security’ 
(objective security), but it can also refer to security provision, security 
distribution or security instruments. In this article, I analyze some of the 
conceptual shifts in the security paradigm.1 These evolve from deeper societal 
transformations, including globalisation, privatisation, pluralisation and 
hybridisation. The paradigmatic shifts have been addressed in new security 
strategies at the local, national and international levels of governance. 
Increasingly, the re-framing of local, national and international security 
strategies is founded on the notion of prevention. Thus, security discourses 
embrace notions such as anticipatory risk assessment by seeking to predict the 
outcome of multiple futures, applying pre-emption in internal as well as 
external security environments as well as the widespread use of surveillance 
instruments for the pro-active monitoring of movements, transactions, careers 
and intentions.2 The growing popularity of this so-called precautionary principle 
at all levels of security governance raises several questions about the reliability 
of early indicators and the possible erosion of the classic presumption of 
innocence. The increased focus on radicalisation, terrorism and organised crime 
has gradually paved the path for the employment of proactive and preventive 
monitoring as regular means to monitor and control human behaviour. This 
article seeks to contribute to the discussion on how the contractual relationship 
between the state and its citizens may be affected and on the political and legal 
challenges that derive from it. 
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I. Shifting Security Strategies 
 
The notion of security has been the subject of reflection by several authors 
such as Buzan, Waever & De Wilde.3 The concept of security has been defined 
as ‘liquid’4 as well as ‘utopian’.5 Complex societal issues are likely to become 
‘securitised’, in the sense that by claiming that a referent object is under threat 
(e.g. the environment, collective health, public transport, public order), a 
security actor performs a series of (often extraordinary) measures which should 
contain the security threat or lead to its decrease.6 Security is thus seen as a 
social construction. Migration, for instance, has been subject to both 
politicisation and securitisation, particularly in the post 9/11 era, where 
immigration law has become an essential pillar of anti-terrorism legislation.7 
The globalisation of security can be regarded as a main push factor for the 
shifting security paradigm. One of the core characteristics of the globalisation 
of security is the merging of global threats and local fears.8 At the same time, 
‘glocal’ connections that exist on the basis of trade and commerce, internet, 
migration and travel, rest on a texture which is increasingly characterised by 
global solidarity and shared vulnerability.9  
 
Several authors engage in a modelling of the shifting governance of security. 
Security governance is often exercised by an intricate web of actors who 
operate across national borders and take recourse to intensive surveillance 
measures.10 Furthering the work of Castells, authors like Bayley, Shearing, 
Johnston, Wood and Gilleir et al. have written about the ‘nodal governance’ of 
security, which defines the provision of security as security bundles provided by 
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a range of authorities.11 This follows a line of thought, where governance – not 
merely of security, but also of other large-scale issues like healthcare, 
education and transport – has become fragmented and pluralised. Hence, the 
‘pluralisation’ of security is one of the main trends identified in security 
governance.12  
 
Despite the multi-layering, fragmentation, cross-border transcendence and 
localisation, state and security remain strongly interconnected.13 Different 
layers of government continue to invest in public security, often in combination 
with private players. This lies in a “combination of the symbolic power, cultural 
authority and public legitimacy” of the public security service, “together with 
the access to sources of information and intelligence (notably crime-related 
data) that it facilitates.”14 
 
Globalisation, privatisation, pluralisation and hybridisation are thus jointly 
responsible for a shifting security paradigm and entail a fundamental 
reorientation of the role of the state in the provision of security.15 States build 
their governmental power on the perpetual logic of security deficits and crises. 
As they themselves have become anxious actors – afraid to make errors in their 
calculation of risk – they build a preventative logic in the definition of their 
security policies.16 
 
II. Preventive Security Empires 
Recent security strategies have been restyled and now focus on the fusion 
between internal and external security. The interconnection between different 
approaches is strongly promoted within the different security strategies that 
have been defined at the local, national and international level. Looking at the 
nation-state level within the European Union (EU), it is instructive to analyse 
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the argumentation in the British National Security Strategy.17 The Strategy 
document argues that the international landscape has been transformed, in the 
sense that the bipolar power construction has been replaced by a more 
complex and unpredictable pattern of relationships. Furthermore, the Strategy 
document presents a considerable shift in the security landscape and 
establishes that former threats have been replaced by a series of 
interconnected factors, such as globalisation, climate change, asymmetric 
distribution of wealth and welfare, competition for energy, as well as 
demographic shifts.18 As a consequence, this “single overarching strategy”19 
deals with threats emanating from transnational crime, pandemics and 
flooding, threats that are potentially harmful to large groups of citizens. The 
British document regards “early engagement”20 as a method to tackle the root 
causes of terrorism and radicalisation. Across the national borders, this can be 
done by supporting fragile states, to prevent them from further decline. In the 
spirit of an integrated approach, a multi-lateral and multi-agency strategy is 
advocated: the police, armed forces, border inspection, intelligence and 
security services are ushered to build coalitions, together with the private and 
‘third’ sector. 
Hence, the shift toward the preventive (early) intervention, even beyond 
national borders, is noticeable: “Wherever possible, we will tackle security 
challenges early. We are committed to improving our ability to scan the horizon 
for future security risks, and to developing our capabilities for preventive 
action.”21 Thus, the document codifies pre-emptive action.22 The term ‘pre-
emption’ became official part of the discourse when – under United States 
President G.W. Bush – the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America marked the end of the deterrence strategy which characterised the 
Cold War and heralded a new doctrine which codified action against ‘emerging 
threats’. Carrying out a pre-emptive strike against a country before the other 
side undertakes military action and before there is a formal declaration of war 
raises several ethical questions.23 The war in Iraq, for instance, was driven by 
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precautionary motives and was based on an apocalyptic fear of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.24  
 
In a similar vein, the National Security Strategy of the Netherlands25 
acknowledges that the cause of several security problems may be beyond its 
national borders. Moreover, it observes the diffusion of security threats and 
seeks to establish an integrated risk assessment and multi-agency approach. 
Several vital interests are identified, notably territorial, economic, ecological 
and physical safety, and socio-economic stability. Further, it seeks to build in a 
forecasting perspective on the basis of horizon scanning, risk assessment and 
scenario-building, while making it coherent with international security 
strategies. 
 
At an international level of security governance, the EU Security Strategy26 
advocates an integrated strategy with a prominent position for preventive 
interventions. The key threats identified by the EU Security Strategy are: 
terrorism and violent religious extremism; the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, including the spread of missile technology; regional conflicts; state 
failure; and organised crime.27 The EU concept of a comprehensive security 
strategy rests on a diffuse threat analysis. Compared with the American 
perception of security threats, which has lately focused on the threat 
emanating from global terrorism, the EU promotes a security strategy which 
emphasises the root causes of terrorism, radicalisation and organised crime.28  
 
This means that the EU seeks to deploy civilian instruments alongside military 
forces in its approach to conflicts or struggles with a fragmented authority.29 
The strategy thus promotes a comprehensive approach, particularly by 
outlining the potential contribution of the EU to crisis management 
operations.30 The EU Security Strategy views globalisation as a mixed blessing: 
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on the one hand, it encourages free trade and mobility31 while on the other it 
contributes to frustration and injustice. Pandemics, energy, water, food and 
economic challenges are all seen as issues closely interconnected with (in-) 
security. 
 
In line with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) opines that 
security at home means security abroad.32 In the meantime, NATO has been 
involved in developing a new Strategic Concept33 to tackle ‘new threats’, such 
as cyber attacks, piracy, large-scale energy disturbance and fragile states.34 
NATO acknowledges the emergence of a number of “diverse non-traditional 
security threats”, which challenge the organisation to step beyond its original 
role. A key characteristic of newly emerging threats is that they no longer have 
to occur within NATO territory: “they could affect NATO’s security even if they 
originated from beyond NATO’s borders.”35 Similarly, NATO works with a 
predictive method and as such it has initiated a ‘multiple futures project’, 
inspired by a growing range of challenges that it may currently not be equipped 
to deal with.36 Opting for a ‘spiral approach’, the NATO discussion is meant to 
lead to a common understanding of key strategic trends, their drivers and a 
series of possible futures from which the potential challenges facing NATO and 
their implications37 could be discussed. 
 
Hence, at the level of international security governance, the common 
denominator between the European and the American approach is the notion 
of early defence. As argued above, the National Security Strategy of the USA 
outlined the need for anticipatory action “to defend ourselves”.38 The EU 
Security Strategy says that “We need to be able to act before countries around 
us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before 
humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more 
serious problems in the future.”39 The EU employs the discourse of enhancing 
the security in neighbouring regions and third states, e.g. by using the strategy 
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of Security Sector Reform.40 The EU Security Strategy also proposes that 
‘common actions’ are best based on common appreciations of risk: the sharing 
of intelligence between Member States and partners of the EU is therefore 
strongly promoted.41 
 
The fusion between internal and external security seems to establish the 
pretext for an increased focus on extraterritorial engagement in combination 
with an early intervention doctrine. Within the external security sphere, the 
Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P)42 has gradually gained ground, albeit 
with controversial discussions concerning the legal legitimacy of military 
interventions in foreign jurisdictions and the recourse to “vocabularies of 
imperialism”.43 The R2P principle relates both to intervention as well as 
prevention and reconstruction.44 
 
All security actors, whether they operate at a national or international level, 
seem to have unfolded a preventive and even pre-emptive strategy which 
provides them with legitimate arguments to intervene proactively, in the sense 
that the intervention beyond their own territory is seen as necessary in order to 
protect their own security. In the recent past, this has been done in the context 
of combating drug trafficking, counter-terrorism as well as the prevention of 
irregular migration.45  
 
III. Preventive Logic in the Security Discourse 
 
The negative and even apocalyptic discourse about insecurity “provides a 
justification for ‘pro-active’ policing, ‘pre-emptive’ military strikes and 
‘administrative and exceptional justice’, all of which consider anticipated 
behaviour as sufficient reason for action.46 According to the same logic, we take 
“elaborate precautions against cigarette smoke, obesity, fast food, unprotected 
sex or exposure to the sun”.47 Kessler regards the precautionary principle as a 
representation of a ‘new discursive practice’: “The shift alters the very relation 
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 Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken 2009 supra note 32, p. 11; I. Ioannides, ‘European 
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43
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between the political, the economic and the law and thereby goes beyond the 
image of a ‘broadening’ of the security concept”.48 This emerging practice goes 
along with the anticipatory and calculated management of risk.49 
 
In this line of thought, we are moving from a post-crime society to a pre-crime 
society.50 The pre-crime model has a more ‘prospective orientation’, concerned 
with the “calculation of risk and the prevention of future harms in the name of 
security”.51 Along with Zedner, Borgers & Van Sliedregt observe the emergence 
of preventive criminal justice, which increasingly works based on the 
precautionary principle. Their criticism is that the costs derived from the use of 
the precautionary principle are not sufficiently taken into account. Against the 
background of social, legal, economic and political developments, the central 
notion is that citizens ought to be protected against various dangers. Criminal 
liability is broadened “by criminalizing the preliminary stage before a harmful 
act has taken place”.52 In the field of counter-terrorism, the precautionary logic 
has culminated in “an expansion of investigatory and prosecutorial power with 
regard to terrorism”,53 which is visible, for instance, in pre-trial detention. 
Furthermore, Borgers & Van Sliedregt observe the widening of the use of secret 
information in court proceedings: notifications from the General Intelligence 
and Security Service (AIVD) can be used as evidence in criminal cases. Finally, it 
has been observed that there is now – as a consequence of UN and EU 
regulations – the possibility to freeze the assets and confiscate possessions of 
organisations that are suspected of (participating in) terrorist activities. The 
prevention of crime, through early diagnosis and the active undermining of 
would-be deviant activity, means that a classic principle of law – namely the 
presumption of innocence – is left behind, and that the legal system runs a 
higher risk of imposing wrongful convictions. 
 
The preventative logic also has a deep effect on law enforcement practices. 
According to Zedner, the “preventive possibilities of policing were recognised 
even in its origins”, but the “point of intervention has been brought forward”,54 
and she associates this with the new – not uncontroversial - doctrine of pre-
emption or anticipatory self-defence. 9/11 has given a significant impulse to 
pre-emptive measures, particularly in relation to radicalisation, terrorism and 
serious crime.55 Anticipatory management of criminogenic situations (actuarial 
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justice) and hyper-social intervention are also identified as factors that 
encourage the use of pre-emptive measures. 
 
Indeed, with the “War against Drugs” and later the “War against Terrorism”, 
preventive measures have been widely adopted. Significant is the iterative use 
of the addendum ‘pre’, for example in Dutch criminal law. In her analysis of the 
prevention of terrorism through criminal law, Hirsch Ballin talks about 
“preceding the pre-trial investigation a preliminary investigation can take place 
on the basis of facts and circumstances that indications exist that in a group of 
people crimes for which pre-trial detention can be imposed are being planned 
or committed.” 56 Although the requirement is that these crimes are expected 
to result in a “serious infringement of the legal order” and that there should be 
a reasonable suspicion, the “public prosecutor can order a preliminary 
investigation for the purpose of preparing the pre-trial investigation”, and as 
such the preliminary investigation is “proactive”.57 
 
Notwithstanding the introduction of preventive and precautionary measures 
before 9/11, anti-terrorism legislations have shifted standards and thresholds 
for the use of special investigation methods. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
terrorism investigation is extended within the preventive phase. Unfortunately 
however, the wide-scale introduction of proactive and preventive investigation 
methods has not been paralleled with a guarantee of procedural rights. 
 
IV. Preventive Security Instruments 
 
Within EU security bodies such as Europol and Frontex, risk assessment tools 
have become accepted working methods. These risk assessments and threat 
analyses, visible in products such as OCTA (Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment), have evolved into “strategic future-oriented intelligence 
systems”.58 Threat assessments are used as methods to assist policy-makers in 
designing future scenarios of security and policing. Departing from past criminal 
cases and certain conceptual tools, predictions about serious crime and other 
security problems are identified: threat analysis, predictive profiling and 
forecasting are “based on the assumption that uncertainty can be overcome by 
developing new information cycles and focuses.”59 
 
Risk assessments at the European level build on assessments composed at the 
national level. For instance, the United Kingdom’s Serious Organised Crime 
Agency SOCA publishes an annual threat assessment report about various kinds 
of organised crime, including drug trafficking, fraud, and trafficking in human 
beings. In a collaborative fashion, the UK Threat Assessment (UKTA) describes 
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and assesses the threats to the UK posed by serious organised crime to prevent 
the public and private sector, as well as individual citizens, from falling victim to 
crime.60 The Dutch National Police Services Agency (KLPD) produces a similar 
annual threat assessment,61 which emphasises the forecasting perspective, to 
be fed into the National Intelligence Model (NIM). The national threat 
assessment is defined as a future-oriented analysis of organised crime in which 
the threats to Dutch society are addressed specifically. The risk assessment 
should help create a basis for policy-making, prioritise the attention for certain 
crime-development, and help intelligence-gathering activities. 
 
With this wide definition in mind, risk assessment reports assess a rather wide 
variety of phenomena, ranging from trafficking in human beings (exploitation), 
smuggling of illegal immigrants, illegal trading in and smuggling of weapons and 
explosives, trading in and smuggling of heroin and cocaine, the production, 
trading in and smuggling of cannabis and synthetic drugs, the production and 
distribution of child pornography, the production and distribution of 
counterfeit money, environmental crime, fraud, money laundering, crime 
against property, corruption, violence and use of IT. 
 
Surveillance is used widely for proactive security monitoring and has pervaded 
most modern societies in that it touches almost every aspect of our daily 
lives.62 Indeed, technology plays a central role in the surveillance society and in 
the reconfiguration of security.63 In a globalised world, where seemingly states 
are losing control, they operate as co-producers of technologically driven 
security by acting as the sponsors of new technological devices. The financing 
of new technological developments that are used for the purpose of enhancing 
security can be seen as an exponent of mobilizing power. In the ‘techno-
industrial complex’, where industry, politics and security have developed an 
intimate relationship, we have witnessed the application of several new 
technologies in security environments.64 Examples include the wide 
introduction of camera surveillance in public and private spaces; the use of 
fingerprints and biometrics for identity cards such as passports; iris scans for 
pre-boarding procedures; microchips that are placed underneath the skin for 
scanning prior to entry to clubs; the introduction of infrared and microwave 
body scanners, particularly at airports; the use of the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) for the monitoring of mobile telephones; the use of automatic number 
plate registration (ANPR) on motorways; the electronic interception of 
telephone, email and text messages; and the use of radio frequency identifiers 
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(RFIDs) in consumer products.65 Eventually, an intelligence-based, electronically 
monitored system of border controls may be developed across the EU.66 This 
includes the introduction of compulsory fingerprint biometric identity cards and 
specific identity cards for people who work on sensitive locations such as 
airports. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The emergence of new security threats and the wide propagation of the 
integrated, preventive, proactive, intelligence-based approach raises a number 
of questions concerning legal and political governance. Values that are 
embedded “in a pre-emergency institutional culture that take[s] seriously rule 
of law values [are] much more difficult to be able to contain official abuses of 
power, making it more difficult to shift underground.”67  
 
A first issue is whether equity – a norm which implies that all citizens should 
equally profit from the benefits of a social welfare state as the prime provider 
of security – can still be upheld in an era of asymmetric distribution of rights, 
justice, and security and surveillance. Future deviance is increasingly often 
countered through a series of preventive measures against the first people to 
be suspected. In a patriarchal governance style, the movements and 
transactions of the masses are anticipated and calculated with the help of 
surveillance measures. The prevention of future crimes and other forms of 
misconduct may become subject to social engineering. Though proactive 
intervention in personal lives seems to have become a widely accepted 
mechanism, it may gradually lead to the erosion of the presumption of 
innocence. A related legal challenge is the ability to prove malice aforethought, 
certainly if there has not been a material or physical perpetration of a criminal 
offence. In the context of counter-terrorism and anti-organised crime efforts, 
there has been ample emphasis on the criminalization of preparatory acts, such 
as conspiracy and the financing of terrorist activities. This involves a close 
reading of the mind of the potential criminal or terrorist. 
 
Finally, the blurring between police and military, public and private, national 
and international governance68 requires new parameters to ensure procedural 
legitimacy.69 If the horizon of security-focused thinking is subject to constant 
change, it will entail the reconfiguration of security organisations and their 
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mandates. Forecasting methods raise pertinent ethical issues,70 for instance 
how the information – intelligence – is gathered and whether this involves 
disproportionate measures at the expense of private life. How serious should 
indications of future crimes or acts of war be before forecasting methods are 
legitimised? What kind of conditions apply when police, law enforcement, or 
military intervene proactively in order to pre-empt public disorder, crime or 
war? The precautionary principle has already pervaded many spheres of justice, 
which fact requires an objective, comprehensive and balanced discussion of 
trust and legitimacy concerns. 
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